New troubleshooting article for the recurring 'security wants to access
Claude Code-credentials' prompt that persists even after Always Allow
(ACL invalidation on binary-signature change / token refresh / post-boot
churn). Covers triage, the reset-and-relogin fix, and the file-based
credentials workaround with its plaintext tradeoff. Registered in
SUMMARY + troubleshooting index; cross-linked with the corrupt-credential
login-failure article (distinct symptom).
2026-06-15: mirroring is reproducibly stuck on Connecting again with
Tailscale accept-routes still off, so the 06-14 it-works conclusion was
wrong. _asquic endpoint resolves but the QUIC/AWDL datapath never
completes; awdl0 bounce, full reboot, and phone radio cycle all failed.
Reframed as an intermittent macOS 27.0 beta AWDL bug; QuickTime USB
remains the workaround.
The postfix MX-lookup example hard-coded majormail's real public IP
(stale DO address). Swap in an RFC 5737 documentation IP (203.0.113.10)
so the published wiki doesn't expose a real fleet IP.
majormail (2026-06-14) had the correct system hostname but still mailed
from majormail-hetzner — the old provisioning label was hardcoded in
logwatch.conf MailFrom and fail2ban jail.local sender. Add a variant
section covering the config grep sweep and the templated-vs-static
Ansible regression caveat.
Covers enabling the [mailer] for password recovery (relay via a tailnet mail
server, no-auth/mynetworks, FORCE_TRUST_SERVER_CERT for IP targets), CLI password
reset + the must-change-password=true gotcha, adding an SSH key via the basic-auth
API when locked out, and ruling out a server-side cause for a 'changing' password.
New troubleshooting runbook for Logwatch reports titled with the Hetzner
provisioning label instead of the real hostname; cross-linked from the
logwatch fleet-setup and VPS migration baseline articles, plus a new
'set system hostname' step in the post-migration checklist.
Documents the Ansible-by-IP known_hosts gap: interactive ssh works (key
stored under hostname) but Ansible connects by inventory IP and fails with
UNREACHABLE/Host key verification failed. Includes tailnet-safe ssh-keyscan
fix and prevention notes. Surfaced by the Hetzner migration IP churn.
Documents why WSL2 hosts fail an Ansible reboot play at privilege
escalation (Timeout waiting for privilege escalation prompt) — WSL2 has
no real reboot semantics + become stalls over the Windows OpenSSH->WSL2
bridge — and the fix: scope reboot.yml to hosts: all:!wsl. Registered
in SUMMARY.md and 05-troubleshooting/index.md.
New troubleshooting/networking article covering the three SSH failure modes
after a fleet migration (stale hardcoded IP, Tailscale 1.98.x cold-path
teardown, rebuilt-box host-key mismatch) and the durable fix (MagicDNS names +
known_hosts purge + ConnectTimeout), with the WSL2 no-resolver caveat.
Cross-links the existing host-key article (adds a 'when pinning the IP is
wrong' callout) and adds the SUMMARY nav entry.
Document that VAAPI HEVC on Polaris can't beat already-efficient H.264 (YouTube/
Twitch/stream archives), so output comes out larger and lands in hevc_failed.txt.
Add already_failed() guard so the batch skips known-bad files on queue rebuilds
instead of re-attempting them. Also: MIN_FREE_GB note (start-only check) and a
source-bitrate triage snippet for picking real encode candidates.
New 05-troubleshooting/networking article covering the case where ssh <alias>
fails host-key verification because no Host block exists and the alias resolves
via Tailscale MagicDNS to a name with no known_hosts entry (key stored under the
IP). Registered in SUMMARY.md and the troubleshooting index.
Backing up two unpublished draft articles that existed only in a working-tree
stash. Drafts — NOT in SUMMARY.md nav and NOT merged to main, so not published
to notes.majorshouse.com. Pre-commit nav check bypassed intentionally (--no-verify).
- 05-troubleshooting/claude-code-warp-login-corrupt-keychain-credential.md
- 05-troubleshooting/iphone-mirroring-connecting-hang-awdl-stall-beta.md
Operational/how-to references updated to the role entry playbooks after the
ADR-0001 migration. Historical incident narrative (dated callouts, commit
refs) preserved.
- clamav-fleet-deployment: override + re-run -> clamav.yml; role note
- ssh-hardening-ansible-fleet: note this is now the ssh_hardening role
- vps-migration-baseline-checklist: table -> clamav.yml / ssh_hardening.yml
- ssh-socket-tailscale-race-condition: Affected Hosts + Prevention + References
-> tailscale role tasks (network_wait/ssh_only_ubuntu/ssh_only_fedora)
- freshclam-logwatch-false-no-updates: codify refs -> clamav role
dcaprod-hetzner + tttpod-hetzner were missing tailscale-wait-ready.service
(inert ssh.service gate -> latent bind race); corrected playbook applied to
both. teelia uses Tailscale SSH (no sshd, immune). All Ubuntu hosts now on
the dependency-free-socket + ssh.service-gate pattern.
- Fedora hosts are NOT automatically immune: a leftover manual
`ListenAddress <tailscale-ip>` drop-in reintroduces the sshd boot bind-race
even under firewalld (hit on majordiscord 2026-06-07; fix = remove it).
- The Ubuntu playbook kept shipping the cycle-causing [Unit] gate on
ssh.socket despite the 2026-06-04 resolution; re-running it re-armed the
ordering cycle (clobbered majorlinux; majortoot-hetzner found armed).
Corrected in MajorAnsible e0d35aa. Fleet ssh-lockdown state is inconsistent
(dcaprod/tttpod lack wait-ready; teelia no override) — needs a per-host audit.
Document the majormail 2026-06-07 incident: when userdb home == maildir
root, the LDA/Sieve duplicate database (.dovecot.lda-dupes + .locks) lands
inside the mail store and the maildir lister exposes it as phantom
mailboxes ("dovecot.lda-dupes"), logging stat(.../tmp) "Not a directory".
Fix: point home at a non-dotted subdir. Wired into the troubleshooting
index and SUMMARY.
Document the majormail spam-routing failure (2026-06-06): a cleanup
header_checks REDIRECT keyed on the milter-added X-Spam-Flag never fired for
real inbound mail (only locally-injected), so spam kept reaching the inbox.
Fix is to route in Sieve at delivery (after the milter), with a redirect +
loop guard. Includes the 'local-injection tests lie' warning.
Document the daily /etc/cron.daily/clamav-freshness watchdog as the real
detector for stale signatures, and the key gotcha that 'mail' is absent on
most fleet hosts so alert scripts must use /usr/sbin/sendmail -t.
logwatch's clam-update counts only 'process started' lines (emitted only at
daemon restart), so daemon-mode freshclam false-alarms on quiet days despite
signatures updating. Fix: $ignore_no_updates=1 drop-in. Includes the
real-vs-false check (a daemonless box with freshclam disabled is a TRUE alert).
New page documenting the majormail (2026-06-05) issue: /etc/localtime
shipped labeled etc_t instead of locale_t on the Hetzner image, so SELinux
denied systemd-timedated and timedatectl/community.general.timezone reported
success while the symlink stayed at UTC. Fix: restorecon before setting TZ.
Indexed in index.md (SELinux) + SUMMARY.md.
- New page: Dovecot IMAP vsz_limit OOM from a bloated/corrupt index.log
(152M index on an empty folder killed IMAP children with error 83).
- fail2ban IMAP self-ban: add permanent ignoreip-whitelist fix + dynamic-IP caveat.
- firewalld mail ports: add 'submission/587 never added' variant + correct
Fedora service name; note Ansible now manages the full mail-service set.
- Index + SUMMARY updated with the new page.
Three updates to the inbound spam filtering guide, all driven by the 2026-06-04
majormail-hetzner Phase 6 cutover and follow-up tuning:
1. Section 6 (Dovecot Sieve): warn explicitly that `plugin/sieve_before` was
dropped in Pigeonhole 2.4 and silently does nothing — no startup warning,
spam just keeps landing in INBOX. The 2.4 replacement is a top-level
`sieve_script <name> { type = before; path = …; }` block. Also note the
Fedora-flat-dovecot.conf pitfall (some packagings ship dovecot.conf
without `!include conf.d/*.conf`, so the block has to live in the main
file directly). Added a `sievec` compile step.
2. New §6b: route spam to a separate `junk@` mailbox via Postfix cleanup
`header_checks` REDIRECT. This makes spam invisible to the user's
mailbox entirely — Spark/IDLE-based clients don't push-notify because
the message never reaches the subscribed mailbox at all. Includes the
`regexp:` vs `pcre:` map-type tip (use regexp on stock Fedora to avoid
the postfix-pcre package dependency).
3. New §7a: weekly systemd timer for sa-learn. The §7 warning about
"don't run sa-learn from cron unless folders are clean" is correct as
the safe default — but when you adopt the §6b REDIRECT-to-junk@
pattern, the junk@ mailbox is pure spam by design and a weekly
`--spam`/`--ham`/`--sync`/`--force-expire` chain becomes safe and
useful. Full unit templates included.
Gotchas table gains four entries:
- Pigeonhole 2.4 silent breakage of plugin/sieve_before
- postfix-pcre vs regexp map type confusion
- Why sieve fileinto Junk still pushes a Spark notification
- Why local `sendmail` injection doesn't trigger the REDIRECT (smtpd
milters skip sendmail-injected mail, so X-Spam-Flag isn't added)
All changes match what's now codified in the `majormail` Ansible role
(commit 7a8b9eb in MajorAnsible).
New 02-selfhosting/services article: the full Postfix/Dovecot inbound spam stack
on Fedora — spamass-milter tag-only wiring (the -r footgun), socket permissions
(sa-milt group + UMask), site-wide Bayes DB, Sieve-to-Junk, and sa-learn training
(folders, spam/ham balance, manual-not-cron). From the majormail setup.
Also extends selinux-dovecot-vmail-context with a Permissive-mode variant + a
postfix_cleanup->mysqld_etc companion-denial note. SUMMARY.md nav updated.
The weekly media-prune cron (and monthly accounts refresh --all) were
removed 2026-06-01 after repeatedly breaking avatars. Update the
majortoot sections: the 648->7GB shrink was a one-time safe attachment
cleanup; automation is now disabled; prune attachments manually if ever
needed, never profiles. Cross-link the two new troubleshooting articles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New article mastodon-s3-acl-upload-failures.md: a BucketOwnerEnforced S3
bucket plus a stale S3_PERMISSION/S3_ACL in .env.production makes every
Mastodon upload fail with AccessControlListNotSupported, silently. Covers
symptoms (incl. why a missing object returns 403 not 404), diagnosis,
the fix (S3_PERMISSION= empty, public read via bucket policy), recovery,
a synthetic-write health check, and Ansible enforcement.
Extend mastodon-prune-profiles-trap.md: add a "Bulk restore at scale"
procedure (list existing keys, null missing DB refs, enqueue
RedownloadAvatar/HeaderWorker), a "storage-level deletion without DB
de-ref" section, and a stronger recommendation to disable automated
profile pruning (and scheduled accounts refresh --all) entirely.
Link both from SUMMARY.md and the selfhosting index.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related additions covering the 2026-05-31 cutover-night incidents on
majorlinux and majortoot-hetzner.
ssh-socket-tailscale-race-condition.md (update Race 1 fix):
- After=tailscaled.service Requires=tailscaled.service orders against the
service becoming active, not against tailscale0 having an IPv4 — hosts
kept losing SSH intermittently after reboots (incident: majorlinux +
majortoot-hetzner 2026-05-31, during cutover-night Ansible reboot).
- Canonical fix: a oneshot tailscale-wait-ready.service that polls
`ip -4 -o addr show tailscale0` until an address is present, with
ssh.socket After=/Requires= that service. Document the full evolution
(2026-05-19 BindsTo → 2026-05-23 Requires → 2026-05-31 wait-ready) so
future readers don't try the half-fixes thinking they're sufficient.
- Add majortoot-hetzner to affected hosts.
mastodon-post-install-hardening.md (new):
Four upstream-install gaps that bit during the majortoot-hetzner cutover:
1. /home/mastodon at 0750 (useradd default) → nginx www-data can't
traverse → every static asset 403s → unstyled "purple screen" in the
browser while API/HTML still work through the puma proxy.
2. .env.production at 0644 (mastodon-setup default) → DB_PASS,
SECRET_KEY_BASE, OTP_SECRET world-readable once gap (1) is fixed.
3. mastodon user shell at /usr/sbin/nologin → `su - mastodon` blocked.
4. rbenv init in .bashrc only → login shells don't source .bashrc; even
when chained, Ubuntu's .bashrc returns early for non-interactive
shells. Fix: .bash_profile sets up rbenv BEFORE sourcing .profile +
.bashrc, so it works for both interactive and non-interactive logins.
All four codified in MajorAnsible configure_mastodon_permissions.yml
with self-asserting verification steps.
02-selfhosting/index.md + SUMMARY.md:
Add a "Services" section to the selfhosting index linking the
mastodon-post-install-hardening article (and the other orphaned
services/ entries while there). SUMMARY.md gains one new entry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
